C-Log: a knowledge representation language of causality by Bogaerts, Bart et al.
C-Log: A Logic of Causality
Bart Bogaerts Joost Vennekens Marc Denecker
Jan Van den Bussche
Report CW656, Februari 2014
KU Leuven
Department of Computer Science
Celestijnenlaan 200A – B-3001 Heverlee (Belgium)
C-Log: A Logic of Causality
Bart Bogaerts Joost Vennekens Marc Denecker
Jan Van den Bussche
Report CW656, Februari 2014
Department of Computer Science, KU Leuven
Abstract
Cause-effect relations are an important part of human knowl-
edge. In real life, humans often reason about complex causes linked
to complex effects. By comparison, existing formalisms for repre-
senting knowledge about causal relations are quite limited in the
kind of specifications of causes and effects they allow. In this pa-
per, we present the new language C-Log, which offers a significantly
more expressive representation of effects, including such features as
the creation of new objects. We show how Approximation Fixpoint
Theory can be used to define a formal semantics that captures the
intuitions underlying this language. We also compare C-Log with
several related languages and paradigms, including inductive defini-
tions, disjunctive logic programming, business rules and extensions
of Datalog.
MSC : Primary : I.2.4
C-log: A Logic of Causality
Bart Bogaerts and Joost Vennekens and Marc Denecker
Department of Computer Science, KU Leuven
{bart.bogaerts, joost.vennekens, marc.denecker}@cs.kuleuven.be
Jan Van den Bussche
Hasselt University & transnational University of Limburg
jan.vandenbussche@uhasselt.be
Abstract
Cause-effect relations are an important part of human knowl-
edge. In real life, humans often reason about complex causes
linked to complex effects. By comparison, existing for-
malisms for representing knowledge about causal relations
are quite limited in the kind of specifications of causes and
effects they allow. In this paper, we present the new language
C-log, which offers a significantly more expressive represen-
tation of effects, including such features as the creation of
new objects. We show how Approximation Fixpoint Theory
can be used to define a formal semantics that captures the
intuitions underlying this language. We also compare C-log
with several related languages and paradigms, including in-
ductive definitions, disjunctive logic programming, business
rules and extensions of Datalog.
1 Introduction
Cause-effect relations are an important part of human
knowledge. There exist a number of knowledge represen-
tation languages (McCain and Turner 1996; Vennekens, De-
necker, and Bruynooghe 2009; Cabalar 2012) in which logic
programming style rules are used to represent such relations.
The basic idea in all these approaches is that the head of such
a rule represents an effect that is caused by its body. In this
paper, we are particularly concerned with CP-logic (Ven-
nekens, Denecker, and Bruynooghe 2009). More specifi-
cally, we consider the variant of CP-logic without probabil-
ities, and we will extend this language with three features:
dynamic non-determinsitic choice; object creation; and re-
cursive nesting of cause-effect relations. We call the result-
ing language C-log. The main technical contribution of this
paper is to show how approximation fixpoint theory can be
used to provide a clean semantics for recursive causal theo-
ries expressed in C-log.
Let us begin by recalling the guiding principles behind
CP-logic. When compared to predecessors, such as the
causal logic of (McCain and Turner 1996), one of the impor-
tant contributions of this languages is to add two modelling
principles that are common in causal modelling. The first
is the distinction between endogenous and exogenous prop-
erties, i.e., those whose value is determined by the causal
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laws in the model and those whose value is not, respec-
tively (Pearl 2000). The second is default-deviant assump-
tion, used also by, e.g., (Hall 2004; Hitchcock 2007). The
idea here is to assume that each endogenous property of the
domain has some “natural” state, that it will be in whenever
nothing is acting upon it. For ease of notation, CP-logic
identifies the default state with falsity, and the deviant state
with truth. For example, consider the following simplified
model of a bicycle, in which a pair of gear wheels can be put
in motion by pedalling:
Turn(BigGear)← Pedal. (1)
Turn(BigGear)← Turn(SmallGear). (2)
Turn(SmallGear)← Turn(BigGear). (3)
Here, Pedal is exogenous, while Turn(BigGear) and
Turn(SmallGear) are endogenous. The semantics of this
causal model is given by a straightforward “execution” of
the rules. The domain starts out in an initial state, in which
all endogenous atoms have their default value false and the
exogenous atom Pedal has some fixed value. If Pedal is
true, then the first rule is applicable and may be fired (“Pedal
causes Turn(BigGear)”) to produce a new state of the do-
main in which Turn(BigGear) now has its deviant value
true. In this way, we construct the following sequence of
states (we abbreviate symbols by their first letter):
{P}(1)→{P,T(B)}(3)→{P,T(B),T(S)}(2)→{P,T(B),T(S)} (4)
Note that firing rule (2) does not change the state of the
world, because its effect is already true. Moreover, it is ob-
vious that this will always be the case, so this rule may seem
redundant. However, many interesting applications of causal
models require the use of interventions (Pearl 2000), e.g., to
evaluate counterfactuals or to predict the effects of actions.
As shown in (Vennekens, Denecker, and Bruynooghe 2010),
rule (2) allows CP-logic to represent this example in a way
that produces the correct results for all conceivable inter-
ventions in a manner that is more modular and more concise
than, among others, Pearl’s structural models (Pearl 2000).
After rules (1), (3) and (2) have all fired, there are no more
rules left whose body is satisfied and that have not yet fired.
At this point, the process is at an end and the domain has
reached a final state. It is this final state, rather than the de-
tails of the intermediate process, that we are really interested
in. One of the most important properties of CP-logic is that,
while there may be any number of different processes de-
rived from a causal theory, the final state that is eventually
reached is unique for any given interpretation for the exoge-
nous predicates—at least, for examples such as this one. In
general, CP-logic also allows rules with a non-deterministic
effect, such as:
(Turn(SmallGear) : 0.99)Or (ChainBreaks : 0.01)
← Turn(BigGear).
Now, the cause Turn(BigGear) produces one of two possi-
ble effects, and there is an associated probability distribution
over these two possibilities. The effect on the semantics is
that, instead of a linear progression of states as in (4), we get
a tree structure in which each firing of a non-deterministic
rule introduces a branching of possibilities. When consid-
ering also the probabilities associated to non-deterministic
choices, the tree defines a probability distribution over its
leaves, i.e., over the final states that may be reached. It
was shown in (Vennekens, Denecker, and Bruynooghe 2009)
that, given a specific interpretation for the exogenous atoms,
this distribution is unique, even though there may exists
many probability trees that produce it.
In many circumstances, the precise values of the proba-
bilities are not of interest. In such cases, a non-probabilistic
variant of CP-logic may be used, in which these are omitted.
The head of a rule is then simply a disjunction:
Turn(SmallGear)OrChainBreaks← Turn(BigGear).
The trees then no longer produce a probability distribution
over final states, but simply describe the set of all final states
that may be reached. In other words, this formalism has a
possible world semantics. It is this non-probabilistic variant
that concerns us in this paper.
Like other rule-based approaches to causality, CP-logic
uses a very simple way of specifying the possible effects
of some cause, namely, as a disjunction of ground atoms.
Clearly, this does not—or, at least, not directly—cover many
interesting phenomena that may occur in practice:
• A robot enters a room, opens some of the doors in this
room, and then leaves by one of the doors that are open.
The robot’s leaving corresponds to a non-deterministic
choice between a dynamic set of alternatives, which is de-
termined by the robot’s own actions, and therefore can-
not be hard-coded into the head of a rule. A language
construct for representing such choices is present in P-log
(Baral, Gelfond, and Rushton 2004).
• A stallion and a mare that are put in the same field may
cause the birth of a foal. Therefore, not only the properties
of these horses are governed by causal laws, but also their
very existence.
• A horse being the parent of a foal is itself a cause for its
own height to have a causal link to the height of the foal.
Therefore, causal laws may be nested, in the sense that an
effect can itself again consist of an entire causal law.
The goal of this paper is to develop an expressive knowl-
edge representation language that is able to represent these
more complex effects, and others like them, in a direct way.
Moreover, we want to do this in a way that extends the ap-
proach of CP-logic. To summarise, the formal semantics of
the language should consist of a set of possible worlds, each
of which can be constructed by a non-deterministic causal
process. This process will take place in the context of a
fixed interpretation for the exogenous atoms. It will start
from an initial state in which each of the endogenous atoms
is at its default value false. The causal laws of our language
will then “fire” and flip atoms to their deviant value, un-
til no more such flips are possible. Whereas in CP-logic
these flips happen one atom at a time, our extended language
will flip sets of atoms at the same time. Moreover, our logic
will present syntax and semantics for object-creation, as is
needed in the second of the above examples.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows: we start by
introducing causal effect expressions (CEEs) and their infor-
mal semantics in Section 2. In Section 3, we formally define
the effect set of a CEE in a structure (the set of atoms that
is flipped in in one step of the process) and we use this no-
tion to formalise the underlying causal process in the case
where causality is monotone. Next, we start Section 4 with
a discussion about why these techniques do not work in the
general (non-monotonic) case, and suggest solutions based
on Approximation Fixpoint Theory. We end this section
with the semantics of causal theories in the general case.
In Section 5, we explain how C-log can be integrated in FO.
We conclude in Section 6 by comparing C-log with various
other paradigms, including inductive definitions (Denecker
and Ternovska 2008), disjunctive logic programming with
existential quantifications (You, Zhang, and Zhang 2013),
Business Rules systems (Business Rules Group 2000) and
Datalog extensions (Green, Aref, and Karvounarakis 2012).
2 Syntax and Informal Semantics
We assume familiarity with basic concepts of first-order
logic (FO). Vocabularies, formulas, and terms are defined
as usual. A Σ-structure interprets all symbols (including
variable symbols) in Σ; DI denotes the domain of I and
σI , with σ a symbol in Σ, denotes the interpretation of σ in
I. We use I[σ : v] for the structure J that equals I, ex-
cept on σ: σJ = v. Domain atoms are atoms of the form
P (d) where the di are domain elements. We use restricted
quantifications (Preyer and Peter 2002), e.g., in FO, these
are formulas of the form ∀x[ψ] : ϕ or ∃x[ψ] : ϕ, meaning
that ϕ holds for all (resp. for a) x such that ψ holds. The
above expressions are syntactic sugar for ∀x : ψ ⇒ ϕ and
∃x : ψ ∧ ϕ, but such a reduction is not possible for other re-
stricted quantifiers that we will define below. We call ψ the
qualification and ϕ the assertion of the restricted quantifica-
tions. From now on, let Σ be a relational vocabulary, i.e., Σ
consists only of predicate, constant and variable symbols.
2.1 Syntax
Definition 2.1. Causal effect expressions (CEE) are defined
inductively as follows:
• if P (t) is an atom, then P (t) is a CEE,
• if ϕ is a first-order formula andC ′ is a CEE, thenC ′ ← ϕ
is a CEE,
• if C1 and C2 are CEEs, then C1AndC2 is a CEE,
• if C1 and C2 are CEEs, then C1OrC2 is a CEE,
• if x is a variable, ϕ is a first-order formula and C ′ is a
CEE, then Allx[ϕ] : C ′ is a CEE,
• if x is a variable, ϕ is a first-order formula and C ′ is a
CEE, then Selectx[ϕ] : C ′ is a CEE,
• if x is a variable and C ′ is a CEE, then New x : C ′ is a
CEE.
We call a CEE an atom-expression (respectively rule-,
And-, Or-, All-, Select- or New-expression) if it is of
the corresponding form. We call a predicate symbol P en-
dogenous in C if P occurs as the symbol of a (possibly
nested) atom-expression in C, i.e., if P occurs in C but not
only in first-order formulas. All other symbols are called
exogenous in C. This is a straightforward generalisation of
the same notions in CP-logic. An occurrence of a variable x
is bound in a CEE if it occurs in the scope of a quantification
over that variable (∀x, ∃x, Allx, Selectx, or New x) and
free otherwise. A variable is free in a CEE if it has free oc-
currences. A causal theory, or C-log theory is a CEE with-
out free variables. By abuse of notation, we often represent
a causal theory as a set of CEEs; the intended causal theory
is the And-conjunction of these CEEs. We often use ∆ for
a causal theory and C, C ′, C1 and C2 for its subexpressions.
2.2 Informal Semantics of CEEs
A CEE is a description of a set of causal laws. In the con-
text of a state of affairs—which we represent, as usual, by
a structure—a CEE non-deterministically describes a set of
effects, a set of events that take place and change the state of
affairs. We call such a set the effect set of the CEE. From
a CEE C, we can derive causal processes similar to (4); a
causal process is a sequence of intermediate states, starting
from the default state, such that, at each state, the effects de-
scribed by C take place. The process ends if the effects no
longer cause changes to the state. A structure is a model of a
CEE if it is the final result of such a process. There are two
kinds of effects that can be described by a CEE: 1) flipping
an atom from its default to its deviant state and 2) creating
a new domain element. We now explain in a compositional
way what the effect set of a CEE is in a given state of affairs.
The effect of an atom-expressions A is that A is flipped
to its deviant state. A conditional effect, i.e., a rule expres-
sion, causes the effect set of its head if its body is satisfied in
the current state, and nothing otherwise. The effect set de-
scribed by an And-expression is the union of the effect sets
of its two subexpressions; an All-expression Allx[ϕ] : C ′
causes the union of all effect sets of C ′(x) for those x’s that
satisfy ϕ. An expression C1OrC2 non-deterministically
causes either the effect set of C1 or the effect set of C2; a
Select-expression Selectx[ϕ] : C ′ causes the effect set of
C ′ for a non-deterministically chosen x that satisfies ϕ. An
object-creating CEE New x : C ′ causes the creation of a
new domain element n and the effect set of C ′(n).
Example 2.2. American citizenship can be obtained in sev-
eral ways. One way is passing the naturalisation test. An-
other way is by playing the “Green Card Lottery”, where
each year a number of lucky winners are randomly selected
and granted American citizenship. We model this as follows:
All p[Applied(p) ∧ PassedTest(p)] : American(p)
(Select p[Applied(p)] : American(p))← Lottery.
The first CEE describes the “normal” way to become
an American citizen; the second rule expresses that one
winner is selected among everyone who applies. If I
is a structure in which Lottery holds, due to the non-
determinism, there are many possible effect sets of the above
CEE, namely the sets {American(p) | p ∈ DI ∧ p ∈
AppliedI ∧ PassedTest(p)I} ∪ {American(d)} for some
d ∈ AppliedI . The two CEEs are considered indepen-
dent: the winner could be one of the people that obtained
it through standard application, as well as someone else.
Note that in the above, there is a great asymmetry
between Applied(p), which occurs as a qualification of
Select-expression, and American(p), which occurs as a
caused atom. This means that the effect will never cause
atoms of the form Applied(p), but only atoms of the form
American(p). This is one of the cases where the qualifica-
tion of an expression cannot simply be eliminated.
Example 2.3. Hitting the “send” button in your mail ap-
plication causes the creation of a new package containing a
specific mail. That package is put on a channel and will be
received some (unknown) time later. As long as the package
is not received, it stays on the channel. In C-log, we model
this as follows:
Allm, t[Mail(m) ∧HitSend(m, t)] : New p :
Pack(p)AndCont(p,m)AndOnCh(p, t+ 1)And
Select d[d > 0] : Received(p, t+ d)
All p, t[Pack(p) ∧OnCh(p, t) ∧ ¬Received(p, t)] :
OnCh(p, t+ 1)
Suppose an interpretation HitSendI = {(MyMail, 0)} is
given. A causal process then unfolds as follows: it starts in
the initial state, where all endogenous predicates are false.
The effect set of the above causal effect in that state con-
sists of 1) the creation of one new domain element, say
p, and 2) the caused atoms Pack( p), Cont( p,MyMail),
OnCh( p, 1) and Received( p, 7), where instead of 7, we
could have chosen any number greater than zero. Next, it
continues, and in every step t, before receiving the pack-
age, an extra atom OnCh(p, t+ 1) is caused. Finally, in the
seventh step, no more atoms are caused; the causal process
ends. The final state is a model of the causal theory.
3 Semantics of Causal Theories
In this section we formalise the above intuitions. We
start by formalising the effect set of a CEE without New-
expressions, and introduce New-expressions afterwards.
We conclude with a discussion on causal processes where
preconditions of effects contain endogenous predicates and
different such rules can affect each other’s preconditions,
i.e., where recursion is present.
3.1 Basic CEEs
In this subsection, we assume that all CEEs are New-free,
i.e., they have no subexpressions of the form New x : C ′.
Definition 3.1. LetC be a CEE and I a structure. We define
the possible effect sets of C in I by induction:
• If C is P (t), then the only possible effect set of C is the
singleton {P (tI)}.
• If C is C1AndC2, then a set V = V1 ∪ V2 is a possible
effect set of C if V1 is a possible effect set of C1 and V2 is
a possible effect set of C2.
• If C is C1OrC2, then a set V is a possible effect set of C
if V is a possible effect set of C1 or of C2.
• If C is C ′ ← ϕ, then a set V is a possible effect set of C
if either ϕI is false and V = ∅ or ϕI is true and V is a
possible effect set of C ′.
• If C is Selectx[ϕ] : C ′, then a set V is a possible effect
set of C if there exists a d ∈ DI such that I[x : d] |= ϕ
and V is a possible effect set of C ′ in I[x : d].
• If C is Allx[ϕ] : C ′, let S = {d ∈ DI | I[x : d] |= ϕ},
then a set V is a possible effect set of C if V is the union
of sets (Vd)d∈S such that each Vd is a possible effect set
of C ′ in I[x : d].
As is evident from this definition, a CEE C may have
different possible effect sets in a structure, caused by
non-deterministic choice on instances of Or- and Select-
subexpressions. In the context of a causal process, it
is important that, once such a non-deterministic choice
has been made, it remains fixed throughout the entire se-
quence of states. For instance, if C contains Allx[R(x)] :
P (x)OrQ(x), then for each domain element d the process
chooses either P (d) or Q(d) and it sticks to this choice dur-
ing the entire process. To enforce this, we introduce the fol-
lowing concepts.
Definition 3.2. Let ∆ be a causal theory; we associate a
parse-tree with ∆. An occurrence of a CEE C in ∆ is a
node in the parse tree of ∆ labelled with C. The variable
context of an occurrence of a CEE C in ∆ is the sequence
of quantified variables that occur on the path from ∆ to C
in the parse-tree of ∆. If x is the variable context of C in ∆,
we denote C as C〈x〉 and the length of x as nC .
For example, the variable context of P (x) in
Allu[R(u)] : Select y[Q(y)] : Allx[Q(x)] : P (x)
is [u, y, x].
Instances of an occurrence C〈x〉 correspond to assign-
ments d of domain elements to x.
Definition 3.3. Let ∆ be a causal theory and D a set. A
∆-selection ζ in D consists of
• for every occurrence C of a Select-expression in ∆, a
function ζselC : D
nC → D,
• for every occurrence C of a Or-expression in ∆, a func-
tion ζorC : D
nC → {1, 2}.
BothOr and Select-expressions force the causal process
to make a non-deterministic choice. The results of these
choices can then be recorded in a ∆-selection ζ. For in-
stance, let C〈y〉 = Selectx[ϕ] : P (x, y), and e = ζselC (d).
Then the effect set of the instance of C assigning d to y is
{P (e, d)}. For C〈y〉 = AOrB, the causal process will
cause C1 if ζorC (y
I) = 1, and C2 otherwise.1
Definition 3.4. Let ∆ be a CEE and I a structure. Suppose
ζ is a ∆-selection in DI . Let C〈y〉 be an occurrence of a
CEE in ∆. The (actual) effect set of C with respect to I and
ζ (denoted by effI,ζ(C)) is a set of domain atoms, defined
recursively as follows:
• If C is P (t), then effI,ζ(C) = {P (tI)},
• if C is C1AndC2, then
effI,ζ(C) = effI,ζ(C1) ∪ effI,ζ(C2),
• if C is C ′ ← ϕ, then effI,ζ(C) = effI,ζ(C ′) if I |= ϕ,
and effI,ζ(C) = ∅ otherwise,
• if C is Allx[ϕ] : C ′, then
effI,ζ(C) =
⋃{effI[x:d],ζ(C ′)|d ∈DI∧I[x : d] |=ϕ},
• if C〈y〉 is C1OrC2, then
– effI,ζ(C) = effI,ζ(C1) if ζorC (y
I) = 1,
– and effI,ζ(C) = effI,ζ(C2) otherwise
• if C〈y〉 is Selectx[ϕ] : C ′, let I ′ = I[x : ζselC (yI)],
– then effI,ζ(C) = effI′,ζ(C ′) if I ′ |= ϕ,
– and effI,ζ(C) = ∅ otherwise.
Contrary to what the terminology might suggest, an effect
set (as defined above) is not necessarily also a possible effect
set (as defined in Definition 3.1). Whether this is the case
depends on the ∆-selection ζ, and, in particular, on whether
it makes correct choices for all of the Select-CEEs. To be
more precise, if, for each CEE of the form Selectx[ϕ] : C ′,
ζ chooses only values for x that satisfy ϕ, then the effect
set will be a possible effect set; otherwise it will not. In
Definition 3.8 below, we will define our semantics in such a
way that only appropriate ∆-selections are allowed.
3.2 Object-Creating CEEs
A possible effect set of a New-expression can contain an
atom U(d), with U an auxiliary unary predicate symbol not
in Σ; such an atom means that d is a “new” element.
Definition 3.1 (continued). Let C be a CEE and I a struc-
ture. We extend the definition of possible effect sets to
New-expressions as follows:
• If C is New x : C ′, then a set V = V ′ ∪ {U(d)} is a
possible effect set of C if V ′ is a possible effect set of C ′
in I[[x : d]].2 We call d the element created by C in I.
Informally, it is clear that different New-expressions
should create different elements. Therefore, we will demand
from a possible effect set that this is indeed the case and we
will define a ∆-selection accordingly. However, it does not
guarantee that the elements are really “new”: we do not ex-
clude the possibility that a created element d already exists
in I. This is a technical detail: during a causal process, at
1This notion of selection is reminiscent of the way the Hilbert
operator  is defined in (Ackermann 1925).
2 We use I[[x : d]] for the structure with domain DI ∪ {d}
equal to I except interpreting x by d.
some point when an expression New x : C ′ fires, it creates
a new element. At later points in time we might need to re-
evaluate the CEE because one of its subexpressions fires. In
that case, a ∆-selection remembers which the created ele-
ment n was and C ′(n) is caused for that specific n.
Definition 3.3 (continued). In addition, a ∆-selection in
D consists of
• for every occurrence C〈y〉 of a New-expression in ∆, an
injective partial function ζnC : D
nC → D,
such that furthermore the images of all functions ζnC are dis-
joint (i.e., such that every domain element can only be cre-
ated once).
A remark concerning Definition 3.3 is that selection func-
tions for New-expressions are partial. This is needed be-
cause otherwise, their injectivity would imply that D should
be infinite in almost all cases. Often, not all choices are rel-
evant. Consider (New y[t] : P (y))Or (New x[t] : Q(x)).
Whichever choice we make for the Or-expression, one of
the two selections for New-expressions is redundant. In-
tuitively, a ∆-selection should be defined only on those in-
stances of New-expressions where its effect set matters. If
d has no image under ζnC , we say that ζ
n
C(d) does not denote.
In order to incorporate newly created elements in the ef-
fect set of a CEE, we cannot simply use a ∆-selection in
DI , as this way it would never be possible to actually create
new objects. On the other hand, when we allow ∆-selections
to range over a larger domain, it might be possible that the
functions for Select-expressions choose something outside
DI . Therefore, we introduce a new concept that intuitively
says when a ∆-selection is a good ∆-selection relative to I.
Definition 3.5. Let ζ be a ∆-selection in D; we call ζ I-
compatible if all selection functions ζselC map into D
I .
Definition 3.4 (continued). Suppose ζ is an I-compatible
∆-selection in some D ⊇ DI .
• if C〈y〉 is New x : C ′, then
– effI,ζ(C) = ∅ if ζnC(yI) does not denote,
– otherwise, let e = ζnC(y
I), then
effI,ζ(C) = {U(e))} ∪ effI[[x:e]],ζ(C ′).
3.3 Recursion in Causal Theories
A ∆-selection in D specifies which elements are created,
namely those that are in the image of one of the ζnC functions.
We define the set ζin of initial elements of ζ as the subset
of D consisting of the non-created elements.
From now on, let ∆ be a causal theory, I a fixed Σ-
structure and ζ a ∆-selection in DI such that for each con-
stant σ, σI ∈ ζin. With LΣI,ζ we denote the set of all Σ-
structures J with ζin ⊆ DJ ⊆ DI such that for all exoge-
nous symbols σ: σJ = σI |DJ . Thus LΣI,ζ are the structures
with smaller domain than I, at least containing all initial el-
ements, such that I and J agree on the exogenous symbols
of ∆. We define a lattice order≤ onLΣI,ζ as follows: J ≤ J ′
if DJ ⊆ DJ′ and for all predicates P , P J ⊆ P J′ . The least
element ⊥ in this order is the structure with domain ζin in-
terpreting all endogenous predicates as the empty set.
Given a ∆-selection ζ in DI , we can restrict ζ to be J-
compatible by restricting the ζselC functions to D
J . We de-
note this restriction by ζ|J .
Definition 3.6. We define the immediate causality operator
Oζ in LΣI,ζ as the operator that sends each structure J to a
structure J ′ ∈ LΣI,ζ such that (using ζ ′ for ζ|J ):
• d ∈ DJ′ if and only if d ∈ ζin or U(d) ∈ effJ,ζ′(∆),
• for endogenous symbols P , d ∈ P J′ if and only if P (d) ∈
effJ,ζ′(∆).
The operator Oζ applies the updates described by ∆ to a
structure, thus resulting in a new structure. Applying this
operator iteratively, starting from the initial state ⊥, yields a
process similar to (4). If Oζ is monotone, then the sequence
constructed in this way will be such that caused atoms are
never undone. In other words, once an atom is caused, it
remains true in the rest of the process. This property ensures
that the sequence converges. Monotonicity of Oζ holds in
many cases, as the following theorem illustrates.
Theorem 3.7. Oζ is a monotone lattice operator for every
ζ if ∆ satisfies one of the following conditions:
• ∆ does not containNew-expressions and no endogenous
predicates occur in the scope of a negation in first-order
formulas3 in ∆, or
• all first-order formulas3 in ∆ are positive first-order for-
mulas without universal quantification ∀.
Idea of the proof. The above conditions guarantee that more
qualifications of causal effects will hold in larger structures.
If more qualifications hold, Oζ derives more domain atoms,
and hence Oζ is monotone.
In case of a monotone operator, it is easy to define when
a structure is a model of ∆, or intuitively, when a structure
can be constructed using the causal laws in ∆.
Definition 3.8. Let ∆ be such that one of the two conditions
in Theorem 3.7 is satisfied. We say that I is a model of ∆
(notation I |= ∆) if there exists a ∆-selection ζ such that I
is the least fixpoint of Oζ , and effI,ζ(∆) is a possible effect
set of ∆ in I.
The intuitions behind this definition have already been ex-
plained in the context of CP-logic (Vennekens, Denecker,
and Bruynooghe 2009). A model should be a fixpoint of ∆
because of the principle of sufficient causation: if the pre-
condition for a causal law is satisfied, then the event that it
triggers must eventually happen. The fact that we demand
that it is the least fixpoint comes from the principle of uni-
versal causation: all changes to the state of the domain must
be triggered by a causal law whose precondition is satisfied.
The fact that it is the least fixpoint also excludes deus-ex-
machina effects, where an atom is caused based on its own
truth, e.g., a rule Q ← Q can never cause Q. The second
condition, that effI,ζ(∆) is a possible effect set, is a techni-
cal detail to exclude bad ∆-selections. This excludes situa-
tions where an instance of a non-deterministic CEE causes
3Qualifications ofAll- and Select-expressions and conditions
of rule-expressions.
nothing because a selection function makes a bad choice—
an element not satisfying the qualification—or (in the case
of New-expressions) a selection function does not denote.
Definition 3.8 formalises the idea that each (instantia-
tion of) a New-expression creates a unique different ele-
ment that extends the domain. Uniqueness is guaranteed by
the definition of ∆-selection; the least-fixpoint computation
starts from a domain ζin, henceNew-expressions really ex-
tend the domain.
Example 2.2 (continued). Let us return to the example of
the American Lottery.
All p[Applied(p) ∧ PassedTest(p)] : American(p)
Select p[Applied(p)] : American(p)← Lottery
Suppose a domain {a, b, c, d} of persons is given. Let I
denote a structure such that LotteryI = t, AppliedI =
{a, b} and PassedTestI = AmericanI = ∅. The struc-
ture I is not an intended model of the causal theory since
the lottery took place, but no-one won. With ∆-selection ζ
such that ζselC () = c (with C being the Select-expression),I is the least fixpoint of Oζ . The choice c for the Select-
expression violates its qualification, hence effI,ζ(∆) is not
a possible effect set. We find that indeed I is not a model
of ∆. Models of ∆ are exactly those structures in which ev-
eryone who passed the test and one random (not necessarily
different) person obtain the American nationality.
Example 3.9. Let us consider the creation of the natural
numbers. This can be seen as a causal process in which
every number causes one new number—its successor—to be
created. We express this in C-log as follows:
New x : (Nat(x)AndZero(x))
Allx[Nat(x)] : New y : (Nat(y)AndSucc(x, y)).
Notice that for any ζ, Oζ is monotone. All models I of
∆ interpret Nat as the natural numbers (modulo isomor-
phism). The corresponding ζ has a nullary selection function
ζnC0 such that ζ
n
C0
() = 0 (modulo isomorphism), and unary
selection function ζnC1 such that for each natural number n,
ζnC1(n) = n+1 for the above CEE-expressions respectively.
The intermediate states Ii have domain ζin ∪ [0, i− 1], and
interpret Nat as [0, i − 1]. The limit structure is the least
fixpoint of Oζ , and effI,ζ(∆) is indeed a possible effect set.
For any other structure I and corresponding ζ, i.e., for
structures I not interpreting Nat as the natural numbers,
NatI is either finite in which case ζnC1 is partial on Nat
I
and in this case, effI,ζ(∆) is not a possible effect set, or
NatI contains more elements, in which case I is not the
least fixpoint of Oζ .
4 Semantics of General Causal Theories
The strategy described in Section 3.3 does not always work.
When negation is present, Oζ can derive unintended effects.
Example 2.2 (continued). We extend the example about
American citizenship with two more laws: an American cit-
izen obtains a green card (GCO stands for “Green Card Ob-
tained”) when he comes to an office; the office closes when
every American has received his green card.
Allx[American(x) ∧ ComeToOffice(x)] : GCO(x)
Close← (∀x[American(x)] : GCO(x))
Especially the last rule is of interest to us because it contains
a negative occurrence of American(x). If we consider the
state in which all endogenous predicates are false, the effect
set of the above CEE contains Close. However, we intended
the office to stay open until all winners have their card.
The reason why in the above example things go wrong is
because the process that causes x to become “American” is
still ongoing when the last rule is executed. The condition in
the last rule actually refers to final state; we can only execute
it as soon as we know who the Americans are. We could fix
this by introducing an order on causal effects, but doing so
would strongly compromise the usability of the logic. In-
stead, we use an existing framework to define valid causa-
tion sequences for general causal theories. The idea is that
we work with partial information: instead of applying an
operator to a structure, we apply it to a partial structure con-
taining information about the atoms that have been caused,
and the atoms that might still be caused
4.1 Partial Structures with Partial Domain
We briefly summarise some concepts from three-valued
logic and generalise them to allow open domains. A truth-
value is one of the following: {t, f,u} (true, false and un-
known). We define f−1 = t, t−1 = f and u−1 = u. Two
interesting partial orders are defined on the set of truth val-
ues: the precision order ≤p , given by u≤p t and u≤p f and
the truth order f ≤ u ≤ t.
Definition 4.1. A partial set S is a function from objects to
truth values.
We identify a partial set with a tuple (Sct,Spt) of two
sets, where the certainly true set Sct is {x | S(x) = t}
and the possibly true set Spt is {x | S(x) 6= f}. The union,
intersection, and subset-relation of partial sets are all defined
pointwise. For a truth value v, we define the restriction of
a partial set S to this truth-value, denoted r(S, v), as the
partial set mapping x to min≤(S(x), v).
A partial Σ-structure I consists of 1) a domainDI : a par-
tial set of elements, and 2) a mapping associating a value
to each symbol in Σ; for constants, this value is in DIct, for
predicate symbols this is a partial set P I ⊆ DI . We often
abuse notation and use the domain D as if it were a predi-
cate. A partial structure I is two-valued if for all predicates
P (including D), P Ict = P
I
pt. There is an obvious one-to-
one correspondence between two-valued partial structures
and structures. If I and J are two partial structures with
the same interpretation for constants, we call I more precise
than J (I ≥p J ) if for all its predicates P (including D),
P Ict ⊇ PJct and P Ipt ⊆ PJpt .
We now define the value of an FO formula in a partial
structure as an extension of the Kleene valuation (Kleene
1938). Intuitively, the value of a quantification ∀x : ϕ, is the
value of the restricted quantification ∀x[DI(x)] : ϕ, i.e., if
there is enough information to derive that all elements that
might be in the domain, satisfy ϕ, this formula is true; if
there is enough information to conclude that for one element
in the domain, ϕ does not hold, this formula is false; other-
wise, its value is unknown.
Definition 4.2. Given a partial structure I, we define the
Kleene valuation (KlI) inductively based on the Kleene
truth tables:
• KlI(P (t)) = P I(tI),
• KlI(¬ϕ) = (KlI(ϕ))−1
• KlI(ϕ ∧ ψ) = min≤ (KlI(ϕ),KlI(ψ))
• KlI(ϕ ∨ ψ) = max≤ (KlI(ϕ),KlI(ψ))
• KlI(∀x : ϕ) = min≤
{
max(DI(d)−1,KlI[x:d](ϕ))
}
• KlI(∃x : ϕ) = max≤
{
min(DI(d),KlI[x:d](ϕ))
}
4.2 Causal Theories and Partial Structures
The effect set of a CEE in a partial structure is a partial set: it
contains information on everything that is caused and every-
thing that might be caused. Intuitively, it differs from Defi-
nition 3.4 by evaluating all quantifications relative to DI .
Definition 4.3. Let ∆ be a CEE and I a partial structure.
Suppose ζ is an I-compatible ∆-selection. Let C be an oc-
currence of a CEE in ∆. The effect set of C with respect to
I and ζ is a partial set of domain atoms, defined recursively:
• If C is P (t), then effI,ζ(C) = {P (tI)},
• if C is C1AndC2, then
effI,ζ(C) = effI,ζ(C1) ∪ effI,ζ(C2),
• if C is a rule-expression C ′ ← ϕ, then
effI,ζ(C) = r(effI,ζ(C ′),KlI(ϕ)),
• if C is Allx[ϕ] : C ′, then
effI,ζ(C) =
⋃{r(effI′,ζ(C ′),min≤(DI(d),KlI′(ϕ))) |
d ∈ DIpt and I ′ = I[x : d]}
• if C〈y〉 is C1OrC2, then
– effI,ζ(C) = effI,ζ(C1) if ζorC (y
I) = 1,
– and effI,ζ(C) = effI,ζ(C2) otherwise
• if C〈y〉 is Selectx[ϕ] : C ′, let e = ζselC (yI), I ′ = I[x :
e] and v = min≤(DI(e), KlI′(ϕ)), then
effI,ζ(C) = r(effI,ζ(C ′), v),
• if C〈y〉 is New x : C ′, then
– effI,ζ(C) = ∅ if ζnC(yI) does not denote,
– and effI,ζ(C) = {U(ζnC(yI))} ∪ effI′,ζ(C ′), where
I ′ = I[[x : ζnC(yI)]] otherwise,
We now define the partial immediate causality operator, a
three-valued variant of Oζ similar to the well-known Fitting
operator for logic programs (Fitting 1985).
Definition 4.4. The partial immediate causality operator Aζ
sends each partial structure J to a partial structure J ′ with
the same interpretation for exogenous symbols and such that
• DJ′(d) = t if d ∈ ζin and DJ′(d) = effJ,ζ(∆)(U(d))
otherwise, and
• for endogenous symbols P , P (d)J′ = effJ,ζ(∆)(P (d)).
Simply iterating the above operator does not possess the
nice properties we found in Section 3.3. Consider the bike
example from the introduction. If P is false, we would ex-
pect that none of the gears starts turning. However, iter-
atively applying Aζ , starting from the initial state, where
T (B) = T (S) = u, also ends in this state, instead of ending
in the structure where both atoms are false.
Luckily, such principles have been studied intensively in
the field of Approximation Fixpoint Theory.
4.3 Approximation Fixpoint Theory (AFT)
In this section, we summarise the basic concepts from
Approximation Fixpoint Theory (Denecker, Marek, and
Truszczyn´ski 2000). From now on, let (L,≤) be a complete
lattice, i.e.,≤ is a partial order on L and every subset S of L
has a least upper bound lub≤(S) and a greatest lower bound
glb≤(S). We write ⊥ and > for glb≤(L) and lub≤(L) re-
spectively. Pairs (x, y) ∈ L2 are used to approximate all
elements in the interval [x, y] = {z | x ≤ z ∧ z ≤ y}. Pro-
jections on such pairs are defined as usual: (x, y)1 = x and
(x, y)2 = y. The precision ordering on L
2 is defined as
(x, y) ≤p (u, v) if x ≤ u and v ≤ y, i.e., if (x, y) approxi-
mates all elements approximated by (u, v), or in other words
if [x, y] ⊆ [u, v]. We call (x, y) ∈ L2 consistent if it ap-
proximates at least one element, and use Lc to denote all
consistent elements. Elements (x, x) ∈ Lc are called exact.
An operator O : L→ L is monotone if it respects ≤, i.e.,
if x ≤ y implies O (x) ≤ O (y). An element x ∈ L is a
fixpoint of O if O (x) = x. An operator A : L2 → L2 is
an approximator of O if it is ≤p -monotone, internal in Lc
(i.e., it maps Lc into Lc) and has the property that for all
x, O (x) ∈ [x′, y′], where (x′, y′) = A (x, x). (Denecker
and Vennekens 2007) defines the notion of well-founded in-
ductions of such an approximator. This concept is based on
the following intuitions. A well-founded induction of A is
a process that uses A to derive more and more information
(i.e., to grow in ≤p ). For CEEs, this will be in accordance
with the principle of sufficient causation. At the same time, a
well-founded induction tries to minimize the upper bounds
(x, y)2. In the context of CEEs, this means that it tries to
minimize the number of new elements created, as well as
the truth of endogenous predicates. In this way, it incorpo-
rates the principle of universal causation.
Definition 4.5. AnA-refinement of (x, y) is a pair (x′, y′) ∈
L2 satisfying one of the following two conditions
• (x, y) ≤p (x′, y′) ≤pA (x, y),
• or x′ = x and y′ satisfies A (x, y′)2 ≤ y′.
Definition 4.6. A well-founded induction of A in (x, y) is a
sequence 〈(xξ, yξ)〉ξ≤α with α an ordinal such that
• (x0, y0) = (x, y);
• (xξ+1, yξ+1) is anA-refinement of (xξ, yξ), for all ξ < α;
• (xλ, yλ) = lub≤p({(xξ, yξ) | ξ < λ}), for each limit or-
dinal λ ≤ α.
A well-founded induction is terminal if its limit (xα, yα) has
no strict A-refinements.
For a given approximator A and a pair (x, y), there are
many different terminal well-founded inductions of A in
(x, y). However, as proven in (Denecker and Vennekens
2007), they all have the same limit, called the A-well-
founded point of (x, y). The well-founded point of A, is the
A-well-founded point of (⊥,>). In (Denecker, Marek, and
Truszczyn´ski 2004) it was shown that it suffices to define an
approximator only on elements of Lc in order to uniquely
characterize its well-founded point.
4.4 Models of General Causal Theories
Now that we recalled the basics of AFT, we can apply this
theory to C-log. First, we note that (LΣI,ζ ,≤) is indeed a
lattice. Furthermore the consistent part of (LΣI,ζ)
2 is exactly
the set of partial structures under the precision order. The
following lemma shows that AFT is indeed applicable.
Lemma 4.7. Aζ is an approximator of Oζ .
As explained above, the notion of a well-founded induc-
tion captures—in a general, algebraic way—the intuitions
behind both the principles of sufficient and universal causa-
tion. This motivates the following definition.
Definition 4.8. Let ∆ be any causal theory. We say that
structure I is a model of ∆ (notation I |= ∆) if there exists
a ∆-selection ζ such that (I,I) is the well-founded point of
Aζ , and effI,ζ(∆) is a possible effect set of ∆ in I.
For monotone operatorsOζ , the well-founded point ofAζ
is the least fixpoint ofOζ . Hence, this definitions generalizes
Definition 3.8. When applying this definition to the extended
American lottery example, we see that well-founded induc-
tions correctly model the desired behaviour. In the first step
of a well-founded induction starting from the initial state,
some atoms American(d) are derived; the other predicates
remain unchanged. In the second step, rightful Americans
get their green card, and Close still remains unknown. Only
in the last phase of the induction, Close is derived.
The above example shows that even though no explicit
ordering of execution of causal effects is given, AFT man-
ages to guess the correct ordering. As shown in (Vennekens,
Denecker, and Bruynooghe 2009), the well-founded induc-
tion process essentially introduces an assumption of tempo-
ral precedence, whereby all CEEs that might cause a cer-
tain effect are assumed to take place before this effect itself.
While this assumption is not necessarily always correct, it
has been shown to be typically satisfied.
5 FO(C-log): Integrating FO and C-log
First-order logic and C-log have a straightforward integra-
tion, FO(C-log). Theories in this logic are sets of FO sen-
tences and CEEs. A model of such a theory is a structure
that satisfies each of its expressions (each of its CEEs and
formulas). An illustration is the mail protocol from Exam-
ple 2.3, which we can extend with the “observation” that at
at some time point, two packages are on the channel:
∃t, p1, p2 : OnCh(p1, t) ∧OnCh(p2, t) ∧ p1 6= p2.
Models of this theory represent states of affairs where at
least once two packages are on the channel simultaneously.
This entirely differs from And-conjoining our CEE with
Select t[t] : Select p1[t] : Select p2[p1 6= p2] :
OnCh(p1, t)AndOnCh(p2, t).
The resulting CEE would have unintended models in which
two packages suddenly appear on the channel for no reason.
In FO(C-log), New-expressions can be simulated with
Select-expressions together with FO axioms expressing the
unicity of the newly “created” objects. E.g., New x :
P (x, a)AndNew x : Q(x) is simulated by introducing
auxiliary unary predicates N1 and N2 that identify the ob-
jects created by the expressions and writing:{
(Selectx[t] : (N1(x)AndP (x, a)))And
Selectx[t] : (N2(x)AndQ(x))
}
∀x : ¬(N1(x) ∧N2(x))
It is clear that New-expressions are more natural and more
modular than this simulation.
Despite the syntactical correspondence between CEEs
and FO formulas (And corresponds to ∧, All to ∀, . . . ),
it is obvious that they have an entirely different meaning,
and that both are useful. This is why we chose to introduce
new connectives rather than overloading the ones of FO. The
logic FO(C-log) has further interesting extensions, e.g., by
adding aggregates in FO formulas, including in qualifica-
tions and conditions of CEEs.
6 Comparison and Future Work
Due to its simple recursive syntax, C-log is a very general
logic that generalises several existing logics and shows over-
laps with many others in different areas of computational
logic. C-log is an extension of (the non-probabilistic ver-
sion of) CP-logic. FO(C-log) is an extension of the logic
FO(ID) as defined in (Denecker and Ternovska 2008). An
FO(ID) theory is a set of FO sentences and inductive defini-
tions (ID), which are sets of rules of the form
∀x : P (t)← ϕ,
where ϕ is an FO formula. Such a rule corresponds to a
CEE
Allx[ϕ] : P (t)
or equivalently,
Allx[t] : (P (t)← ϕ)
and a definition corresponds to the And-conjunction of
its rules. (Denecker, Theseider-Dupre´, and Van Bel-
leghem 1998) already pointed to the correspondence be-
tween causality and inductive definitions and exploited it for
solving the causal ramification problem of temporal reason-
ing (McCarthy and Hayes 1969). The CEEs presented here
can be seen as a non-deterministic extension of inductive
definitions with an informal semantics based on causal pro-
cesses.
C-log shows similarity to extensions of disjunctive logic
programming (DLP) such as DLP with existential quantifi-
cation in rule heads (You, Zhang, and Zhang 2013) and the
stable semantics for FO as defined in (Ferraris, Lee, and Lif-
schitz 2011). However, there is an important semantical dif-
ference. Suppose we want to express Example 2.2, where all
people passing a test and one random person are given the
American nationality. The E-disjunctive program
∃X : american(X):-lottery
∀X : american(X):-passtest(X)
is similar to
(Selectx[t] : american(x))← lottery
Allx[passtest(x)] : american(x)
Semantically, the first imposes a minimality condition: the
lottery is always won by a person succeeding the test, if there
exists one. On the other hand, in C-log the two rules execute
independently, and models might not be minimal. In this
example, it is the latter that is intended. We believe that
one advantage of C-log is its clear causal informal seman-
tics. On the other hand, there are ways to simulate the causal
semantics and the New operator of C-log in E-disjunctive
programs while it follows from complexity arguments that
not all E-disjunctive programs can be expressed in C-log.
Other semantics than the stable semantics for DLP have
been developed. For example in (Brass and Dix 1996), D-
WFS, a well-founded semantics was proposed. This seman-
tics has the property that if a program contains two identical
lines, one of them can be removed. However, in our con-
text, a duplicate effect means that a same causal effect hap-
pens twice (maybe for different reasons), independently, and
hence different choices might be made in each of these rules.
The logic of cause and change of (McCain and Turner
1996) differs with C-log in several important aspects; in
McCain & Turner’s logic both true and false atoms need a
cause. In C-log on the other hand, endogenous predicates
can be false (the default value) without reason but can only
be true (the deviant value) if caused. Moreover, we rule
out unfounded “cyclic” causation. For instance, if Pedal is
false, in C-log, Turn(BigGear) and Turn(SmallGear) are
false but in McCain and Turner’s logic they may be true and
caused by each other. We call this “spontaneous generation”
and do not admit it in C-log.
We find operators similar to those of C-log in several other
formalisms. For example, Select-, All-, Or- and rule-
expressions are present in the subformalism of the language
Event-B that serves to specify effects of actions (Abrial
2010). The New operator is found in various other rule
based paradigms, for example in Business Rules systems
(Business Rules Group 2000). The JBoss manual (Browne
2009) contains the following rule:
when Order( customer == null )
then
insertLogical(new ValidationResult(
validation.customer.missing ));
meaning that if an order is created without customer, a new
ValidationResult is created with the message that the cus-
tomer is missing. This can be translated to C-log as follows:
All y[Order(y) ∧NoCustumer(y)] :
New x : ValidationR(x)AndMessage(x, “. . . ”).
Another field in which related language constructions
have been developed is the field of deductive databases. In
(Abiteboul and Vianu 1991), various extensions of Datalog
are considered, resulting in non-deterministic semantics for
queries and updates. One of the studied extensions is object
creation. Such an extension is present in the LogicBlox sys-
tem (Green, Aref, and Karvounarakis 2012). An example
from the latter paper is the rule:
President(p), presidentOf [c] = p← Country(c)
which means that for every country c, a new (anonymous)
“derived entity” of type President is created. Such rules
with implicit existentially quantified head variables corre-
spond with New-expressions in C-log.
Other Datalog extensions with other forms of object cre-
ation exist. For example (Van den Bussche and Paredaens
1995) discusses a version with creation of sets and compares
its expressivity with simple object creation.
Non-deterministic choices have been studied intensively
in the context of deductive databases. In (Krishnamurthy
and Naqvi 1988), a non-deterministic choice in Datalog was
introduced. This choice was static: choice models are con-
structed in three steps. First, models are calculated while
ignoring choices (choosing everything); second, this model
is used to select a number of choices for all occurrences
of choice goals and third, models are recalculated with re-
spect to these choice goals. In (Sacca` and Zaniolo 1990;
Giannotti et al. 1991), it is argued that static choices, do
not behave well in the presence of recursion; hence dynamic
choices were introduced. In (Sacca` and Zaniolo 1990), sta-
ble models provide a model-theoretic description of these
dynamic choices. In (Weidong and Jinghong 1996) an al-
ternative choice principle on predicates P is introduced in
which the values in certain argument positions in the tuples
of P are non-deterministically chosen in function of the val-
ues at the other argument positions. The semantics of that
logic is based on the well-founded semantics; this choice
principle is very different from the principle in C-log. Com-
pared to these, C-log resembles most the language of (Sacca`
and Zaniolo 1990); the difference is that C-log supports a re-
cursive syntax and is based on the well-founded semantics,
whereas (Sacca` and Zaniolo 1990) uses stable semantics.
The above similarities suggest that C-log is a promising
language to study and unify many existing logical paradigms
and to provide a clear informal semantics for them. An in-
depth semantical analysis of the exact relationship between
C-log and the languages described above is an interesting
topic for future work. Another research challenge is extend-
ing FO(C-log) with types, function symbols, arithmetic, etc.
in order to make it useful as a KR-language. We need to
study the complexity of various inference tasks in C-log, and
develop and implement algorithms for these various tasks.
Another research question is to add probabilities to C-log to
obtain an extension of the probabilistic CP-logic, and possi-
bly also of other related logics such as BLOG (Milch et al.
2005) and P-Log (Baral, Gelfond, and Rushton 2004).
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